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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
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NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO U.S.
DRAFT TREATY AND RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TREATY ELEMENTS

REF: A. STATE 88259
[1](#)B. STATE 88260
[1](#)C. STATE 88262
[1](#)D. STATE 88263
[1](#)E. GENEVA 0616 (SFO-GVA-III-001)
[1](#)F. GENEVA 0617 (SFO-GVA-III-002)
[1](#)G. STATE 04678

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-002.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: August 31, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:15 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

Meeting Date: September 1, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) During meetings on August 31 and September 1, the Russian Delegation provided initial comments on the U.S.-proposed draft Treaty (REFS A-D), and presented Russian proposals on several elements of the Treaty. The Russian Delegation also raised the issue of Votkinsk closure under START, delivering points raised previously, and emphasizing that Russia expected all U.S. monitors and equipment to be

gone from Russian territory by midnight on December 4.

¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation stated that the U.S. draft treaty had been prepared professionally, and complimented the United States in this regard. However, Russia was concerned that key issues Russia had raised before were not adequately reflected, noting that Russia had presented specific proposed text for the new treaty that had not been included. Russia perceived an imbalance regarding the treatment of road-mobile missile systems in the U.S. draft as compared to other systems of concern from their perspective, particularly, ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and heavy bombers. Russia also asked why the United States retained START's telemetry provisions when the START limitations that telemetry was meant to verify were not retained. Finally, Russia raised certain elements of the draft treaty's preamble, and questioned specifically why the United States objected to the idea of basing the treaty on the concept of "equal security," and why the United States did not accept Russian-proposed text concerning Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine fulfilling their obligations under START.

¶5. (S) Russia presented its proposal for the new treaty's structure and key elements of certain treaty articles. Russia proposed the new treaty contain fifteen (15) articles, several of which were consistent with the U.S. draft treaty, at least in terms of subject area. Important differences included proposed articles for: deployments and confidence-building measures. Russia did not, however, provide details for each of these elements, noting Russia's complete draft treaty was awaiting approval at the

President's office, and would be provided to the United States at a later date. Russia proposed a single annex to the treaty that would combine elements of the various START Protocols and Annexes, and would include specifically sections on: terms and definitions; treaty database; procedures for conversion or elimination; notifications; inspections, visits and exhibitions; and the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Russia's presentation made clear that the Russian approach was to carry forward text from START, but to limit it significantly. Their draft would be much shorter than the U.S.-proposed draft.

INITIAL RUSSIAN COMMENTS
ON U.S. DRAFT TREATY

¶6. (S) Antonov noted that the U.S. draft START Follow-on treaty had not been distributed to the Russian interagency for review because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not completed the official translation of the document. He provided the following comments, which he characterized as his personal comments, and explained that he only had time to read in detail the treaty's preamble and final provisions:

- The U.S. draft treaty text was prepared very professionally, and it was important that future work be continued in this manner.
- Most importantly, the U.S. draft was clearly derived from START, and the U.S. and Russian positions coincided on several issues. These included: the prohibition on the transfer of strategic offensive arms to third parties; maintenance of existing patterns of cooperation with other states; provisions for the BCC; the preamble; and the treaty's final provisions.
- On the preamble, in comparing the U.S. and Russian texts, there was much in common, and the U.S. approach was "creative" in several places in its attempts to improve the style and to outline some new ideas.
- The U.S. draft, however, did not reflect Russian concerns addressed in previous sessions. This was puzzling as the U.S. Delegation had said that Russia's positions were clear

and noted, although the United States did try to integrate text from the Russian preamble and the final provisions into U.S.-proposed joint draft texts. Without addressing Russia's main concerns, stated in papers given to the U.S. Delegation, it would be impossible to conclude a new treaty. This position was presented several times before, and was not just the position of the Russian Delegation; it was also mentioned by President Medvedev in his speech in Helsinki.

- It was unclear whether the United States sought to compensate its nuclear weapon reductions with increases in conventional strategic strike and missile defense capabilities. Russia could not ignore this possibility. Consideration of the potential impact of the new treaty on Russian national security was especially important before the Russian interagency could submit a proposed document to its leadership. Russia could never accept a treaty that permitted the United States to compensate for reductions with

build-ups of U.S. military potential in other areas.

- Russia would complete its review of the U.S. draft treaty quickly, and would not delay the negotiations. The Russian Delegation proceeded from the timetable established by Presidents Medvedev and Obama; the outcome of the negotiations should be a completed document by late November.

17. (S) Buzhinskiy provided additional comments, as follows.

- The imbalanced nature of the U.S. draft treaty was puzzling, particularly with regard to limits and verification measures for mobile launchers and the inclusion of telemetry provisions. The July 6 Joint Understanding stated that the new treaty would allow each Party to determine for itself the structure and composition of its strategic offensive arms. Further, inspections and verification would be made less costly compared to START. However, one-sixth of the document was devoted to mobile ICBMs, particularly with respect to inspection and verification; or "two out of seventeen articles, 14 of 138 paragraphs, and 23 out of 135 definitions," while only the Russian Side had mobile ICBMs. Therefore, much of the treaty applied only to Russian systems.

- From the military perspective, mobile missiles were not distinguishable from other mobile strategic offensive arms, such as submarines, and were sometimes less effective. In terms of the potential of mobile missiles versus submarines, the greater threat came from submarines, with multiple warhead SLBMs. Mobile missile patrols were limited to the restricted areas and national territory of a Party, which could be sufficiently verified by national technical means (NTM), while the movement of submarines beyond national territory was not restricted, and the secrecy of their movement greatly exceeded that of mobile ICBM systems. However, the United States had not included any limits on the movement of submarines, or any special provisions for NTM of verification or other monitoring provisions.

- The situation was similar for heavy bombers. Their ability to deploy at great distances from their bases, the lack of effective verification for their movement, and their ability to carry a significant number of armaments made them more threatening than mobile missile systems, yet there were no comparable provisions for heavy bombers.

- The U.S.-proposed numerical limits on non-deployed mobile missile launchers were not understandable, particularly since there were no comparable limits for non-deployed SLBM launchers.

- Regarding telemetry, START provided for telemetry exchanges to support provisions concerning throw-weight, heavy ICBMs, and numbers of reentry vehicles that could be flight-tested on new systems. None of these provisions, however, were included in the draft treaty, and the U.S. reference to transparency was not clear. The separate reference within the Definitions Annex to the SS-25 within the definition of

"new type" was also puzzling.

- Based on an initial review, the conclusion drawn was that the U.S. draft treaty did not reflect the April 1 Joint Statement of the Presidents. In his view the mechanical

inclusion of START treaty text in the new treaty would not result in a good treaty.

U.S. RESPONSE TO ISSUES
RAISED BY RUSSIA

18. (S) Gottemoeller replied to the Russian points with the following comments.

- The United States had listened intently and read with interest the papers provided by Russia concerning their key issues (REFS E and F), and the U.S. Delegation would provide additional responses later in the session. However, the United States continued to wait for specific Russian-proposed language to insert into the draft treaty.

- Regarding the limitations and provisions for mobile missiles, the United States had worked hard to remove provisions from START that constrained mobile missile operations. The measures that remained served to verify limits rather than restrict operations.

- Regarding heavy bombers, the U.S. approach was to provide a more accurate account of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers based on the concept of actual deployments.

19. (S) Siemon commented on the telemetry provisions contained in the U.S. draft treaty. While there were no limits in the draft treaty on missile throw-weight or heavy ICBMs, telemetry was important in that it provided understanding regarding the capabilities of new types of missiles. Further, the record of START's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) indicated that Russia had telemetry-related questions in the past concerning the functioning of reentry vehicles. While many of Russia's questions were answered, the United States was prepared to continue to exchange telemetry data as a means to enhance transparency.

10. (S) Warner added the following points regarding the comparison between mobile missile systems and submarines.

- To inhibit the underwater activities of submarines would risk their survivability, and Russia's recognition that the draft treaty did not include provisions to limit underwater activities was accurate.

- However, the number of submarines and SLBM launchers, and the number of warheads for these systems, were limited by the two primary ceilings contained in the draft treaty, and these limits were verifiable. Detailed information concerning numbers of submarines, launchers, and warheads would be included in the treaty's Memorandum of Understanding, in some cases by location. Further, the combination of data update inspections and the nuclear warhead inspections, drawn from reentry vehicle inspections under START, would provide a very detailed examination of the submarine-based capabilities of each side.

- By contrast, the provisions on mobile missiles guarded against the deployment of these systems beyond their bases,

which was important, as these systems were much smaller than an SSBN, which was easily observed by NTM while in port. As Russia MIRVed more of its mobile systems, the percentage of these systems relative to strategic offensive arms would grow. Importantly, however, the United States did not seek restrictions on mobile missiles that would reduce their

survivability. In peacetime, Russia could spread its mobile forces across very large areas. In a crisis it could field a greater percentage of mobile systems. Both of these facts made these systems impossible to target effectively.

¶11. (S) Elliott added that the draft treaty's provisions applied equally to both Sides, as did the provisions for silo-based ICBMs. But, because the United States did not deploy mobile missiles, there existed a potentially destabilizing situation. The United States had proposed transparency measures for mobile missile systems as a stabilizing factor, not a limiting factor. This was not unlike provisions concerning heavy bombers.

¶12. (S) Antonov replied that the discussions on these issues were useful to better understand each other's positions, and such discussions would be continued in the working groups.

REVISITING RUSSIA'S KEY CONCERNS

¶13. (S) Antonov noted Gottemoeller's earlier comment that the United States was waiting for specific Russian-proposed text on its key issues. Russia's proposed text for these issues was included in the papers it had provided at the last session (REFS E and F), and Russia had no additional text. Each of those papers discussed concepts associated with Russia's concerns, and provided specific text for the new treaty. While the text would be included in the draft treaty that Russia was preparing, there would be no new language, and it was surprising that the U.S. Delegation expected additional text, since Russian text had already been provided (in the paper).

¶14. (S) Buzhinskiy added that Russia was not against providing additional details, but the key regarding verification was that it be symmetrical. Mobile missiles comprised the majority of Russia's strategic forces. While the United States might consider them potentially destabilizing, Russia considered non-nuclear missiles to be far more destabilizing. The United States had noted that it has no mobile ICBMs, but it should be noted that Russia has no non-nuclear missiles, and he called for the Sides to make symmetrical reductions. With regard to survivability and what Russia could do in a crisis, that was irrelevant; in a crisis Russia would not be concerned with treaty compliance. Mobile missiles were a major part of Russia's strategic potential, and SSBN forces were a major part of the U.S. potential. To be symmetrical, the United States should consider limiting the range of patrols and exchange of information and NTM measures for its submarines. Otherwise the U.S. proposals limited a significant portion of Russia's potential, while leaving a significant portion of the U.S. potential intact.

¶15. (S) Buzhinskiy continued that heavy bombers provided an analogous situation. They could be located at great distances from their bases and there was no effective verification of their movement. This, combined with their ability to carry multiple armaments at a time, made them no less dangerous than mobile ICBMs. Yet, the U.S. draft treaty contained no special limits or provisions for heavy bombers, though Russia was prepared to accept the U.S. approach to movements of heavy bombers outside national territory. Turning to telemetry, he asked whether the U.S. interest was primarily directed at new types, to which Siemon responded it was.

RUSSIAN QUESTIONS ON
U.S. DRAFT PREAMBLE

¶16. (S) Antonov raised several questions associated with the U.S. draft preamble. Specifically, why did the United States

not agree with the concept of "equal security" presented previously by Russia? What about this concept, was it unacceptable or threatening from the perspective of U.S. national security? How could the Sides build a treaty that was not based on this concept? Would that mean that one Side would have more advantages or disadvantages than the other? This idea was a basic principle of Russian foreign policy. Was it not also a basic principle in U.S. relations with other countries, or did the United States want more security than others? What was wrong with this concept in a treaty in the area of reductions of strategic offensive arms?

¶17. (S) Gottemoeller replied that the U.S. draft contained a range of language covering similar ideas, but at this point in the session it would be more productive to hear other questions than try to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of specific U.S. and Russian formulations.

¶18. (S) Antonov responded that, for Russia, it was not a matter of a better formulation of language, but a basic principle upon which the treaty and negotiations therefore must be based. If the concept were agreeable, then the Sides could accept a simple statement that they were "guided by the principle of equal security." This would clarify the approach to other issues, including mobile missiles, submarines, and others. Both Sides should operate at the same level of rights and obligations.

¶19. (S) Antonov turned to the preambular language on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, stating that the U.S. draft preamble significantly paired down Russian ideas concerning the contributions of these countries. Gottemoeller replied that the U.S. reasoning was simple; from a legal perspective it was not accurate to state that these countries had completely fulfilled their obligations under START, as there were still some outstanding implementation issues. Antonov replied that he was most interested in expressing support for the contributions made by these countries in terms of disarmament and strengthening peace and security. Gottemoeller said that the U.S. Delegation had prepared a U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for the treaty's preamble and a separate U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text on the treaty's final articles. She provided copies of the drafts to the Russian Delegation, noting that the United States had

prepared the text and included specific language that the Russian Delegation had provided. (Begin comment: Separate reporting cables will be sent containing that text. End comment.)

ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN CONCERNS:
LARGE VOLUME OF U.S. TEXT

¶20. (S) Antonov stated that, with regard to volume, the U.S. draft Treaty and START were comparable, particularly in the area of verification. This suggested the United States had departed from the principle of making the new Treaty simpler and less costly compared to START. Gottemoeller replied that Antonov could not be sure of this until the United States presented its proposed Inspection Protocol.

¶21. (S) Warner commented that the United States had eliminated five types of inspections from START, but did keep important elements of the inspection regime, and did so in detail, to support verification. For example, while the United States had dropped close-out inspections, it had retained formerly declared facility (FDF) inspections so that the Sides could verify activities at an FDF should any concerns arise. Similarly, while baseline inspections were dropped, data update inspections were retained and would be used to update any new items. In addition, verification associated with bomber armaments was a new area that required a new approach, which would be made clear when the United States presented its draft Inspection Protocol.

¶22. (S) Gottemoeller emphasized that the United States had removed a number of verification measures, including some measures associated with mobile missiles and, in this regard, was not proposing any additional measures. Antonov again concluded that these issues could be sorted out in the working groups.

Russian Proposals for New Treaty

¶23. (S) Antonov previewed specific Russian proposals for the new treaty by noting the high level of interest that existed within Russia regarding the new treaty, and the common objective of the United States and Russia to complete a new treaty before START expires. Based on the political relationship that existed between Russia and the United States, and the fact that the sides were utilizing START as the basis for work, completing the treaty by the end of November was possible. He noted there was agreement that the START Treaty would not be extended or repeated in full. However, some negative issues remained. The new treaty was being developed in the absence of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was a very important factor that needed to be taken into account. Other issues included ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration, which would hamper strategic stability, and basing of strategic offensive arms outside of the continental portion of national territory. These issues could be overcome based on the will of the Presidents to use the new treaty as the basis for enhancing overall U.S.-Russian relations, and the interest that existed in both

capitals for improving relations. Antonov presented the following summary of the Russian view of the overall structure of the new treaty:

- The new treaty will have an updated preamble and fifteen articles that focus on positive aspects of U.S.-Russian relations in a manner that supports a simpler and less costly treaty in terms of implementation. The fifteen articles will be:

- General provisions
- Central limits
- Counting rules
- Establishment of the database
- Deployment
- Prohibitions and restrictions
- Conversion or elimination
- Notifications
- Confidence-building measures
- Use of national technical means of verification
- Inspections, visits and exhibitions
- Bilateral Consultative Commission
- Cooperation with third states
- Entry into force and termination
- Registration

- The new treaty will have a single annex that would include individual sections on terms and definitions, as well as procedures regarding the database of information, conversion or elimination, notifications, inspections, visits and exhibitions, and the BCC.

¶24. (S) Following presentation of the Russian paper, Antonov summarized Russia's approach, stating Russia intended to streamline the treaty significantly as compared with START, making implementation of the procedures for the treaty much simpler. Russia believed this would make the ratification process easier as well.

¶25. (S) Before turning to members of the Russian Delegation to provide additional details on elements of the treaty from the Russian perspective, Antonov reminded the U.S. Delegation that Russia had presented some specific language for the treaty during the last session. The information to be

presented was in addition to the proposals presented previously. Russia hoped to transmit the rest of its formulations for the draft treaty during the next round of negotiations.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL
FOR TREATY DATABASE

¶26. (S) Orlov presented the following summary of Russia's proposals for the Treaty's database of information.

- The treaty's database of information will serve as the basis for resolving every issue. It is an essential element of the new treaty from the Russian perspective. The accuracy and amount of data must be considered very carefully, as it would serve as the basis for success of the treaty.

- The database should list types and number of strategic offensive arms as of treaty signature, including ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

- Notifications should be provided to indicate when newly-constructed strategic offensive arms become subject to the treaty, similar to START:

- For ICBMs and SLBMs, when they first leave a production facility;

- For heavy bombers, when their air frame is first removed from the shop, plant or building where components are assembled into an air frame;

- For silo launchers, when a protective cover is first installed and "locked;"

- For mobile launchers, when the launcher first leaves the production facility;

- For SLBM launchers, when the submarine associated with the launchers is first launched; and

- For types of arms not included in the treaty, upon agreement within the BCC.

- The role of the BCC will be significant, and difficult to overestimate.

- Missiles developed solely to intercept or counter objects not located on the surface of the earth would not be ballistic missiles to which Treaty limitations would apply. At the same time, such missiles must not have the capability of an ICBM or SLBM, and their associated launchers must have essential differences from launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs. Procedures to confirm differences would be subject to agreement within the BCC, and Russia would be prepared to provide specific proposals.

¶27. (S) In response to a question from Gottemoeller, Orlov stated that the Russian approach would allow for conversion of launchers to a new type. He also stated that Russia did not envision including data associated with warheads in the database. (Begin comment: During the U.S.-hosted reception on September 1, Orlov clarified, during a conversation with Trout, that Russia did not include warhead data in its version of the database because the issue of counting warheads had not been resolved. Once resolved appropriate information would be included. End comment.)

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

¶28. (S) Buzhinskiy presented the following summary of Russia's proposals for confidence-building measures in the

treaty.

- In addition to mandatory verification, Russia proposed the provision of information on a voluntary basis regarding strategic offensive arms that could generate ambiguous

situations. This information could be exchanged not only through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) of each country, but through diplomatic channels. Such information would help prevent misinterpretation of each other's activities.

- This article would also include provisions for discussing within the BCC problems regarding new kinds of armaments that could be considered strategic offensive arms in order to agree on provisions that would apply to these systems.

129. (S) In response to questions posed by Warner, Buzhinskiy further explained that this was Russia's proposal for the entire treaty article concerning confidence-building measures; these were not additions to the existing treaty. He noted that, while the United States sometimes tried to specify all contingencies in treaty language, Russia did not attempt to do so. He concurred with Warner that some types of confidence-building work had been done within START's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), but Russia envisioned that other measures could be pursued also.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON PROHIBITIONS

130. (S) Pischulov presented the following summary of Russia's proposals for Treaty prohibitions:

- In addition to previous Russian proposals on prohibitions against the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration, prohibitions on the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers into launchers for ballistic missile interceptors and the reverse, and prohibitions on the basing of heavy bombers outside of a Party's national territory, Russia also proposed the following:

-- Prohibition against converting heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments to heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments;

-- Prohibition against storing nuclear armaments at bases where heavy bombers converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are based; and

-- Prohibition against training air crews that are assigned to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments to be able to support nuclear missions.

131. (S) In response to the U.S. Delegation's questions regarding the scope of Russia's proposed article on prohibitions, the Russian Delegation confirmed that what they had presented reflected the entire scope of prohibitions envisioned by Russia. Russia sought a very concise set of prohibitions, and many from START were not retained. Antonov explained that Russia had focused on positive relations with the United States, and had concluded that several prohibitions contained in START were excessive.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON NTM

132. (S) Ilin presented the following summary of Russia's proposals for the use of NTM under the treaty, noting that the substance of Russia's proposal did not fully correspond to START.

- Experience with NTM as an element of verification under the INF Treaty and START reinforced the importance of this type

of verification measure. NTM contributed to mutual confidence in treaty compliance.

- Russia proposed to retain NTM as an efficient tool of verification, which had been well tested under START.

- Russia proposed a separate article for NTM use that would include:

- Agreement to use NTM for Treaty compliance;

- An obligation to use NTM in accordance with principles of international law;

- An obligation not to interfere with the use of NTM by the other Party; and

- An obligation not to use concealment measures that would impede verification, including when missiles are tested, though this would not apply to the use of covers or environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

- There would be no specific provisions associated with mobile missile systems, as there were under START.

¶33. (S) In response to a question posed by Gottemoeller, Ilin confirmed that Russia did not intend to supplement NTM with any other form of remote monitoring.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR BCC

¶34. (S) Kotkova presented the following summary of Russia's proposal for BCC under the Treaty.

- The efficiency of START's JCIC, created under Article XV of the START Treaty, was tested over time and its efficiency demonstrated. Russia therefore proposed including START's Article XV in the new treaty with two changes:

- The JCIC would be renamed the BCC; and

- There would be a direct reference to the section of the Russian-proposed new treaty annex that pertained to the functioning of the BCC.

- As compared to the provisions contained in START's JCIC Protocol:

- The new treaty would be a bilateral treaty, and references to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which were added by JCIC Agreement 1, would be removed;

- There would be no provisions authorizing one Party to represent the other, which had been included in the JCIC

agreement;

- There would be no detailed set of procedures for signing documents; and

- There would be no provisions on the order for special sessions, as the use of diplomatic channels for arranging meetings would be sufficient to resolve urgent problems.

¶35. (S) Following her presentation, Kotkova noted that Russia had not seen specific U.S. proposals regarding the BCC, but expressed hope that the U.S. and Russian positions on the BCC were close.

¶36. (S) Gottemoeller asked whether Russia proposed utilizing diplomatic channels instead of communications through the NRRC of each country as a means of coordinating meetings. Kotkova replied that diplomatic channels would be used to augment communications through the NRRC, not replace them. Gottemoeller supported the comment made about the successful

work of the JCIC and expressed her thanks to JCIC Heads Taylor and Koshelev.

RUSSIAN PROPOSALS REGARDING
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

¶37. (S) Ilin presented the following summary of Russia's proposals for treaty terms and definitions.

- Russia based its proposal for the treaty's terms and definitions on those developed for START, while working to reduce and simplify terms.

- Russia added terms relating to ballistic missile defenses, including, for example, the terms "interceptor missile," "launcher of interceptor missiles," and "ballistic missile defense system," which were all relevant to provisions in the article on prohibitions.

VOTKINSK

¶38. (S) Regarding Votkinsk, Antonov noted that the U.S. Delegation already knew everything he was going to say and that he would present it "in a friendly way." His main point was that, under START, all equipment must be dismantled and the U.S. monitoring team must leave Russia before December 5.

He pointed to the positive experience of cooperation under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: both sides started their preparatory work a half year before expiration to ensure an orderly departure. An important point was that there were no difficulties of an organizational nature or equipment. Continuing, Antonov said he did not want any surprises -- he wanted to avoid any "force majeure" situations with respect to people or equipment.

¶39. (S) Antonov noted the U.S. position had changed in recent months. The U.S. Representative in the JCIC had stated as much. Russia was told that, due to the change in

Administration, the United States wanted the START negotiations to get started first before proceeding on Votkinsk. Antonov recalled that on June 16 Russia had sent a note regarding the steps needed to complete the work on Votkinsk. Since the U.S. response was received on August 14 (REF G), he had not slept well. He claimed that the U.S. approach differed from what was discussed previously. Russia felt it could not consider the August 14 communication to be an official answer to its June 16 note; discussion at a higher level was needed. At that point, Ambassador Kislyak had been instructed to meet Under Secretary of State Tauscher. There was surprise in Moscow when Tauscher said the United States "wanted to study the issue." It had been Russian thinking that the Russian position on this issue had already been explained very clearly, and that the U.S. Representatives in the JCIC had understood the Russian position clearly prior to JCIC-XXXIV. He acknowledged that each Party intended to comply with its obligations under START, but their understandings of compliance, once the same, were now different. He noted that he had been instructed by his Minister to present an aide-memoire to the U.S. Side at this meeting.

¶40. (S) Buzhinskiy took the floor to make similar points, though more bluntly, and noted that he was also speaking under instructions of his Minister. He pointed to the change in production at Votkinsk since the 1980s from Treaty-limited missiles only to a wider range of missiles now after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He asserted that Russia had to "tolerate" the U.S. presence due to START, but that "he could not imagine that any Russian authority would accept such an asymmetrical situation in the future." There were 94 days left during which U.S. inspectors would be allowed to remain;

after the Treaty's expiration their privileges and immunities and their official status in Russia would expire. He did not want to "have a situation where the inspectors had problems with the local authorities."

¶41. (S) Gottemoeller responded that the presentation had been clear and 94 days was an accurate number. She recalled that the INF Treaty monitoring at Votkinsk had been concluded in a positive atmosphere and that was the U.S. objective for START. She reminded the Russian Delegation that the United States fully intended to exercise its Treaty rights at Votkinsk until midnight on December 4 and that, if there were no superseding arrangements to START by that time, the U.S. personnel would be gone. She added that the United States continued to believe that there was a role for continuous monitoring in the new treaty, though she acknowledged that the Russian Side was not yet convinced. Therefore, any discussions regarding the conclusion of the START Treaty activities were without prejudice to the new treaty.

¶42. (S) Antonov said the U.S. position was clear and that he was open to discussing any subject related to the reduction of strategic offensive arms at the negotiating table. Technical issues would be discussed at the working group level. Both Sides agreed that the START Treaty was not going to be extended. That said, he viewed the discussion of how to complete activities under START as being on a separate track from the negotiations for the START Follow-on treaty. He did not want to make negotiation of this treaty harder. He understood that the United States wanted to exercise its

full Treaty rights through December 4, but if no decision were taken to extend the monitoring provisions then U.S. personnel would leave on that day. On the other hand, Russia insisted that there not be any equipment left either. He mentioned again avoiding "force majeure." Switching to English, Antonov said "as the Negotiator, I am not really responsible for what happens on this but I am very concerned." He noted that there was very little time left, and that the JCIC had still not signed the relevant agreement, and he personally hated "unfinished business."

¶43. (S) Gottemoeller said she thought both Sides understood the other's position and recalled the importance of completing Treaty implementation fully and constructively. She noted that the use of threatening language did not help the situation and she hoped it could be resolved in a positive manner. (Begin comment: During a lunch hosted by Antonov on September 2, that included A/S Gottemoeller and Ambassador Ries, Buzhinskiy commented that the current Russian position on Votkinsk originated with Prime Minister Putin, who had received a briefing on the PPCM Site and reacted strongly to the notion of Americans being present there. End comment.).

¶44. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for the Preamble,
August 31, 2009; and

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for Final Provisions,
August 31, 2009

- Russia:

-- Russian Proposals for New Treaty;

-- Russian Proposal for Treaty Database;

-- Russian Proposal for Confidence-Building Measures;

-- Russian Proposal on Prohibitions;

-- Russian Proposal on NTM;

-- Russian Proposal for the BCC; and

-- Russian Proposals Regarding Terms and Definitions.

145. (U) Participants.

U.S.:

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Reis
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Dunn
Ms. Eccles
Mr. Elliott
Ms. Friedt

Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA:

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Gen Buzhinskiy
Col Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Adm(Ret) Kuznetsov
Ms. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Neshin
MGen Orlov
Col Pischulov
Mr. Rudenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Tarasov
Mr. Vasiliev
Gen Venetsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Mr. Gayduk (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

146. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS